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Federalism and Moral Disagreement 
Guido Calabresi† and Eric S. Fish** 
  INTRODUCTION   
Americans disagree profoundly on questions of moral prin-
ciple. A policy that is morally necessary to some may be abhor-
rent to others. Examples abound: capital punishment, abortion, 
racial segregation, same-sex marriage, slavery, and alcohol 
prohibition have all at one point or another divided the moral 
convictions of different citizens of the United States. Moral dis-
agreements of this kind can make it difficult for people of dif-
fering views to coexist in the same nation. If one group of peo-
ple considers a policy morally required, and another group 
considers it abominable, then by unifying into one nation each 
group risks being forced to violate its deep moral commitments. 
Those holding opposing views might gain control of the gov-
ernment, and use that power to enact laws that are abhorrent 
to the minority. 
Federalist government structures present a partial solu-
tion to this problem. If the peoples of different states wish to 
unify into a single government without sacrificing their deeply 
held beliefs, they can do so through a structure that leaves cer-
tain moral questions to local control. This allows them to hold 
distinctive moral views that define their local communities and 
local cultures, while at the same time coexisting in a larger na-
tional polity alongside those with whom they disagree. Thus 
the Constitution of the United States created a strong central 
government, but left issues like the legality of slavery to state-
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by-state determination. This permitted the American colonies 
to unify for economic and military reasons while limiting con-
flict over moral issues that divided them as states. Localizing, 
“centrifugal” political forces kept such issues squarely in the ju-
risdiction of local decisionmakers.1 
But, as the example of slavery suggests, such a decentral-
ized structure is potentially unstable. People do not merely 
wish to be able to live according to their own deeply felt moral 
principles; they often also wish to impose those principles upon 
others. Thus federalist systems also exhibit “centripetal” forc-
es—forces that push moral issues towards the central govern-
ment and away from local control, thereby placing deep moral 
conflicts like slavery onto the national agenda. Such moral con-
flicts can sometimes cause the breakup of federalist systems, if 
state majorities decide that they value their own local princi-
ples over the survival of the national union. 
The push and pull between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces helps to explain the dynamics of moral conflict in con-
temporary American politics. Time and again, one group will 
seek to nationalize its beliefs on an issue—abortion, same-sex 
marriage, or alcohol prohibition, for example. This attempt at 
nationalization may take place through the courts, the legisla-
ture, executive branch policymaking, or even constitutional 
amendment. And those holding the opposite view will object 
strenuously to nationalization, invoking the principle of states’ 
rights and the power of local majorities to legislate according 
their own, different moral principles. But if the pendulum 
swings in national politics, and the opponents see an oppor-
tunity to impose their own beliefs nationwide, they jump at the 
opportunity. Localism is wonderful when it lets one live by 
one’s own (correct) beliefs, but not when it lets others live by 
their own (wrongheaded) ones. 
Here we explore the logic of such moral conflicts, showing 
how they help explain the creation, the collapse, and the ordi-
nary politics of federalist systems. Part I argues that one major 
 
 1. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1783-1789 (2015). Ellis describes a number of differ-
ent economic and military rationales for the adoption of the Constitution, in-
cluding that it would be crucial to maintaining the Continental Army, expand-
ing into the West, protecting against the schemes of European powers, and 
establishing good credit with European financiers. We also note that Ellis fre-
quently uses the terms “centripetal” and “centrifugal” to describe the move-
ment of policymaking between the center and the periphery, and that we are 
independently devoted to those terms. 
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cause of federalist unions is the unionizers’ desire to create a 
permanent political alliance while limiting conflict over morally 
inflected policy questions. Part II discusses situations where 
moral disagreements threaten to destroy a federalist union, fo-
cusing on the conflict over slavery in the United States and re-
cent instability over moralized economic and immigration is-
sues in the European Union. Part III examines centripetal and 
centrifugal forces in the normal politics of a federalist union, 
shedding light on how federalist dynamics play out in policy 
conflicts in the United States over moral matters like same-sex 
marriage, abortion, segregation, prohibition, and capital pun-
ishment. Part IV suggests that viewing federalism as a method 
for dealing with moral conflicts between states helps to frame, 
but by no means solves, the difficult legal and political problem 
of defining the proper boundary between the national and the 
local. 
I.  FEDERALISM AS A STRATEGY FOR LIMITING MORAL 
CONFLICT   
People unite into one country for various reasons. Among 
these are mutual defense against a common enemy, the bene-
fits of larger economic units and bigger markets, and because 
they believe that they are “one people.” If, like Italy in the nine-
teenth century, they unite for this last reason, they tend to es-
tablish a unitary rather than a federal governmental system.2 
They do this even if for centuries—as in Italy3—they were sep-
arate polities. They do it—again as in Italy4—even if they spoke 
significantly different languages. By creating a unitary state 
they affirm their common culture, common history, and com-
mon values. And they tend, then too, to claim and develop a 
common language—yet again as in Italy5—which they then as-
sert they have all “historically” shared.6 The fact that, later on, 
 
 2. See generally THE RISORGIMENTO REVISITED: NATIONALISM AND CUL-
TURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ITALY (Silvana Patriarca & Lucy Riall eds., 
2012) (discussing cultural trends in Italy during the country’s founding). 
 3. See ARTURO TOSI, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY IN A CHANGING ITALY 4 
(2001) (discussing Italy’s polycentric structure before unification). 
 4. See id. at 1–3. 
 5. See id. at 4–10. 
 6. See id. at 23–24 (noting that after unification, Italian became the na-
tional language while other languages were demoted to “dialects”). Similarly, 
the revival of Hebrew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
helped to unify the Zionist movement. See Anat Helman, “Even the Dogs in the 
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underlying differences in different parts of the unitary state be-
come evident, and that some degree of recognition of these be-
comes appropriate, which may even lead to some degree of fed-
eralism or regionalism,7 does not alter the underlying reason 
for unification, nor does it fundamentally undercut the role of 
the central government as manifester of the overwhelmingly 
common values and common cultural heritage.8 
If instead separate polities—whether previously colonies of 
another nation or already sovereign states—unite for reasons of 
defense or economic advantage, but think of themselves as “dif-
ferent” from each other in fundamental values or cultural her-
itage, they tend to join together through a federal structure. 
This is because, however strong the reasons for uniting may be, 
the different “states” want to remain different, and to assert 
their differences in values, morals, and culture.9 This is, of 
course, the story of the United States after 1776 and ultimately 
(after one form of weak federalism failed) in 1789.10 It is also 
the story of Europe today. 
The differences in morals, culture, and values among the 
several colonies in the 18th Century—which, by the way, pro-
foundly affect America still—were enormous.11 Slavery is, of 
course, the moral issue that one immediately thinks of. And it 
 
Street Bark in Hebrew”: National Ideology and Everyday Culture in Tel-Aviv, 
92 JEWISH Q. REV. 359, 359 (2002). 
 7. Modern Italy, for instance, is currently moving towards a more feder-
alist system. See Christophe Roux, Italy’s Path to Federalism. Origins and 
Paradoxes, 13 J. MOD. ITALIAN STUD. 325, 325–29 (2008). 
 8. For example, Rome today remains the political and, to some degree, 
the cultural capital of Italy, and Italy has an overwhelmingly common reli-
gion—Roman Catholicism, more or less observed—and a sense of Italian na-
tionhood perdures despite the recent trend towards more decentralized power. 
See, for example, the words of Italy’s national anthem. Inno Nazionale, OF-
FICE OF STATE PROTOCOL, http://presidenza.governo.it/ufficio_cerimoniale/ 
cerimoniale/inno.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 9. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 769, 769–70 (2006) (identifying federalism as a strategy for 
managing strong religious and ideological differences within a nation by let-
ting local subunits govern themselves). Hills’ basic position has significant 
similarities to ours. His discussion of these issues in philosophical terms is 
particularly interesting. 
 10. See ELLIS, supra note 1. 
 11. See Daniel Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitu-
tionalism, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 849, 853–60 (1999) (describing how the American 
constitutional system evolved from one where moral questions were mostly 
decided by states, into one where the national Constitution decided important 
moral questions, largely because of the Civil War and the conflict over slav-
ery). 
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certainly was a dominant difference as the many debates and 
compromises of 1789 (and after) demonstrate.12 But it was just 
one of many. For example, though the colonies spoke a common 
language, their views of fundamental religious truths were pro-
foundly different. Calvinist New England and Anglican Virgin-
ia reflected transcendental beliefs sufficiently different to have 
brought England to civil war well in the memory of all the colo-
nies.13 And these transcendental differences did not reckon with 
the yet more problematic views of Catholic Maryland, Quaker 
Pennsylvania, and—what can one call it but deeply radical—
Rhode Island.14 Moreover, these were not the trivial doctrinal or 
liturgical differences that they might seem to us today to have 
been. The insults—and wars—of all-too-recent memory were on 
the order of those between Sunnis and Shiites in our times! 
And, peculiarly, some economic differences among the colonies 
took on moral attributes as well. Should wealth be financial, 
bank and trade-based, or land-centered? Hamilton, Jefferson, 
and Jackson viewed that as a deep moral issue!15 
Yet, for political-defense reasons, and economic ones as 
well, joining together as a nation—and, after the failure of the 
Articles of Confederation, as one nation with a well-defined 
central government—was a necessity. The solution proved to be 
a truly federal polity, uniting “we the people” and “the sover-
eign states” into the United States of America. The point, and it 
is this that we wish to emphasize, was to join together, as 
needed, but to allow the unified-but-still-separate parts to re-
main different with respect to fundamental values and morals. 
It meant—and still means, but query to what degree, today—
each unit, each sovereign state being willing to accept what 
 
 12. See generally MATTHEW MASON, SLAVERY AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9–41 (2006) (discussing the North and South’s conflicting 
views regarding slavery). 
 13. Cf. ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE 
GREAT AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION 2–4 (2006) (discussing the religious 
divisions within the colonies). 
 14. See Bruce C. Daniels, Dissent and Disorder: The Radical Impulse and 
Early Government in the Founding of Rhode Island, 24 J. CHURCH & ST. 357, 
376–78 (1982); Maria Mazzenga, John Churchman and Quaker Reform in Co-
lonial Pennsylvania: A Search for Spiritual Purity, 83 QUAKER HIST. 71, 71 
(1994); Tricia T. Pyne, The Politics of Identity in Eighteenth-Century British 
America: Catholic Perceptions of Their Role in Colonial Society, 15 CATH. HIS-
TORIAN 1, 2–3 (1997). 
 15. See JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT 
FORGED A NATION 224–42 (2013); ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND 
THE BANK WAR (1967). 
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seemed to it and its citizens to be immoral behavior on the part 
of citizens of other states, in exchange for those other states 
and their citizens letting that state and its citizens do things 
that to them seemed immoral!16 
Thus citizens’ disagreements on matters of moral principle, 
which are deeply intertwined with their cultural identities and 
religious convictions, give the members of a newly formed un-
ion powerful motivation for retaining decentralized sovereignty. 
It is this reason, this grounding, which seems to us to explain 
the existence of a federalist structure in the United States.17 We 
will, soon enough, discuss the consequences of this fundamen-
tal basis for federalism, in the face of the centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces that inhere in federalist polities that united in 
this way. Since, however, other explanations are sometimes 
given for federalist structures, and especially for American fed-
eralism, a few words on these seem appropriate. Here we dis-
cuss in particular two theories from legal scholarship that 
(much like our account) focus on federalism’s functional value 
within the American political system.18 
It is sometimes said that American federalism was created 
to divide power and thereby to lessen the danger of tyranny.19 
And it is certainly true that divisions of authority make an ef-
 
 16. Again we do not mean only the conflict over slavery, but also moral-
ized disagreements over issues like the proper forms of Christian worship and 
the structure of the American economy. 
 17. Cf. MALCOLM FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 38–68 (2008) (arguing that states form 
federalist systems because of conflicts between citizens’ identification with 
their local political unit and the larger national political unit). Our argument 
here is analogous to Feeley and Rubin’s, but unlike them we emphasize the 
role that moral disagreements play in this division of political loyalty. 
 18. Our theory of federalism is also, we believe, broadly consistent with 
many of the explanatory theories found in the history and political science lit-
eratures. It is, however, a different kind of explanation, one that looks at the 
use-value of federalism rather than at federalism’s historical antecedents or 
deeper structural causes. For discussion of major historical and political sci-
ence theories on the origins of American federalism, see, for example, FEELEY 
& RUBIN, supra note 17, at 69–95; ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3–10 (2010). 
 19. See, e.g., Candace H. Beckett, Separation of Powers and Federalism: 
Their Impact on Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 635, 645–46 (1988); Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liber-
alism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 465 (2007); 
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that state 
governments will secure the public’s liberty against threats by the national 
government); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (arguing that state 
governments can check the power of the central government). 
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fective dictatorship more difficult to achieve. The more inde-
pendent sources of power need to be brought under control, the 
harder it is to achieve single-minded authority. But geograph-
ical separation of authority is at best only a weak check against 
an undemocratic central government.20 The separation of pow-
ers within the central government—for example in the United 
States among executive, legislative, and judicial branches—is 
far more important. And the intellectual influence of Montes-
quieu at the time of our Constitution’s framing suggests that it 
was through those divisions that our framers sought protection 
from tyranny, rather than by the “federalist” structure that 
they adopted.21 Indeed, beyond the three divisions of Montes-
quieu, the added Senate and House Congressional divisions 
suggest that the importance of divided authority as a safeguard 
against tyranny was a serious concern. But it was not a concern 
that federalism was principally designed to address, nor one 
that federalism was deemed capable of achieving on its own. 
Rather, the primary reason for establishing a federalist 
system in the United States was that the people of the inde-
pendent states would not fully cede their sovereignty, because 
they thought of themselves as separate peoples with separate 
cultures and beliefs.22 We do not for a moment mean to suggest 
that the existence of a federalist structure is not both useful for 
diminishing the risk of tyranny and employed for that purpose. 
We are claiming only that American federalism was primarily 
created for a different reason—to preserve the separate morals, 
values, and cultures of the individual states—and that counter-
ing the danger of tyrannic rule was an ancillary benefit. 
Similarly, a common attribute of federalism, its capacity to 
experiment, though a quite wonderful advantage, seems histor-
ically an unlikely reason for choosing such a structure. Experi-
mentation, as Brandeis classically pointed out, is something 
that can be done much more easily in a federalist system.23 On-
 
 20. Indeed, as Professor Steven Calabresi has suggested, a proliferation of 
many national subunits can even strengthen the central government. See Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, Does Institutional Design Make a Difference?, 109 NW. U. L. 
REV. 577, 585–87 (2015). 
 21. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 22. See ELLIS, supra note 1, at xii, 8–11. 
 23. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brande-
is, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.”). 
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ly one part of the whole takes the risk of failure, and many dif-
ferent ways of addressing a problem can be attempted with 
some hope that the most successful approach will ultimately 
win out and become broadly adopted throughout the federalist 
polity. One need only think of what might have happened if our 
central government had chosen to address universal medical 
care in this way. Require nationally (and subsidize nationally, 
to the degree needed) that all be covered by medical insurance 
to some minimum degree by some future date. But let each 
state pick whatever structure it wishes to meet that require-
ment—whether through single-payer systems, employment-
based systems, totally private insurance systems, mixed-
Obamacare-type systems, individual health savings accounts, 
or what have you.24 The opposition to each approach would be 
divided, and in time—one might hope—those methods that 
worked best would survive. And citizens could even vote with 
their feet, moving to the states that provided the best health 
care systems.25 
And yet, much as with the tyranny-prevention theory, it is 
hard to imagine that nations have ever opted for a federal 
structure with such arcane, albeit very real, benefits in mind. 
Rather, the opposite seems likely. Experimentation becomes 
possible and occurs because the separate-unified parts of a fed-
eral system have different values and morals. On the basis of 
such differences, some states opt for—and thus experiment 
with—different approaches. And, in time, other states may (or 
may not) accept what the experimenters have done, because of 
its effectiveness and its conformity, from the start or over time, 
with the underlying moral values of those who—later—decide 
to adopt one or another “experimental” approach. Think about 
today’s experiments with legalized marijuana, or assisted sui-
cide, as possible examples, or even Massachusetts’ early exper-
iment with same-sex marriage. These were only made possible 
by the underlying differences in values, morals, beliefs, and 
deep attitudes among the citizens of our nation’s various sover-
eign parts. 
 
 24. Such a requirement could be enforced with a federal fallback: if a state 
fails to establish universal access to health insurance for its own citizens, then 
the federal government will step in and impose its own policy. 
 25. Cf. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 418–20 (1956) (discussing how public expenditures influence 
where citizens choose to live). But see Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Ex-
perimentation, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that the information 
generated through such experiments can cause harm). 
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II.  MORAL DISAGREEMENTS THAT BREAK FEDERALIST 
SYSTEMS   
When different peoples unite in a federalist structure for 
defense or economic reasons, while retaining basic differences 
in fundamental moral and cultural worldviews, then such a 
structure is subject to immense centripetal forces that seek to 
nationalize moral conflicts. Moreover, the greater the moral dif-
ferences, the stronger these forces are. It is hard to accept an-
other’s immoral behavior. And the more immoral that behavior 
seems, the harder it is to accept it. And the fact that the others 
may be required to accept your (in turn) immoral behavior 
doesn’t help too much because, of course, you think that your 
behavior is precisely what all should adhere to. Indeed, if the 
“wrong” behavior of totally separate nations often gives us more 
than pause, and leads us from time to time to interfere in their 
internal affairs,26 it is far harder to accept that kind of behavior 
by those who are, in a very real sense, part of our own nation. 
There is, after all—by definition—a central government that 
deals with issues of defense and economy in the federalist state. 
Why should it not centralize those things that truly matter, is-
sues of morality, whether these concern slavery, religion, or life 
and death? 
But if that central government tries to compel me, and 
those likeminded to me, in my sovereign state, to adhere to be-
havior that we deem to be fundamentally wrong, why should 
we not have the right to pull away and—as a totally separate 
nation—continue to do what we believe is right? And, having 
done so, why should we not deny our previous “partner” states 
the right to interfere in our internal affairs? The desire to make 
others behave morally, according to our vision of morality, and 
the countervailing desire to continue the behavior we deem 
moral in the face of those who would prohibit it, account for the 
enormous centrifugal and centripetal forces that characterize 
federalist systems. And, as we shall soon see, the ultimate re-
sults of these forces are determined by the presence of strong or 
weak central governments in federalist systems, as well as the 
decisions of courts and elected officials concerning which issues 
are properly national and which are properly local. 
Examples in United States history are all too easy to come 
by. Slavery and racial segregation are, of course, the easiest 
 
 26. And rightly so in some cases, such as interventions to prevent ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. 
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and most dramatic ones. While the religious differences, which 
may have been an important original reason for our federalist 
structure, attenuated in the nineteenth century, those deriving 
from slavery dramatically exacerbated. State after state gave 
up its established religion.27 This did not happen quickly eve-
rywhere—Connecticut disestablished Congregationalism only 
in 1818,28 and every president of Yale (the only Connecticut col-
lege until 1823) was an ordained Congregationalist minister 
until 1899.29 And deep religious divisions remain to this day 
and affect our present federalist problems. But still, religious 
differences exerted relatively little pressure on our federalism 
in the nineteenth century compared to those resulting from the 
existence of race-based human bondage. 
At the framing slavery existed all over the United States. 
But it was increasingly disapproved and abolished in the 
North. And this development was pretty clearly presaged in the 
debates and structures regarding slavery that characterized 
the Constitution of 1789.30 Yet despite the deep and increasing 
moral differences slavery remained largely an issue for local, 
state determination for nearly one hundred years.31 Was Lin-
coln right when he said that a nation cannot remain half-slave 
and half-free?32 In retrospect so it turned out (though the 
perdurance of segregation and institutionalized racism makes 
even that retrospective view anything but pellucid). But for 
more than a third of our existence as a nation we were just 
that—half-slave, half-free. And during much of that time, the 
 
 27. See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 9 (2010). 
 28. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the 
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 
2126 (2003). Massachusetts, for its part, did not disestablish until 1833. Id. 
 29. Arthur Twining Hadley, economist and president of Yale from 1899 to 
1921, was the first non-minister to lead the institution. BROOKS MATHER 
KELLEY, YALE: A HISTORY 315 (1999). 
 30. See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAV-
ERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
187–223 (2010). 
 31. Some attributes of slavery were centrally decided from the start: the 
limitation on abolishing the slave trade before 1808 and the counting of slaves 
for voting purposes. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The 
former was even made an “unamendable” part of the national Constitution. 
See id. art. V. But the question of whether to allow slavery in the first place 
was still left for state-by-state determination. 
 32. See 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, “A House Divided”: Speech at Springfield, 
Illinois, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461, 461 (Roy P. 
Basler ed., 1953). 
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abolitionists, those dedicated to declaring the profound immo-
rality of slavery were, for the most part, viewed in the North as 
right but also bothersome.33 “Oh yes slavery is wrong; but we 
are a federalism and we should not impose our views on the 
South,” was a prevailing view in much of the North for longer 
than we now perhaps would like to remember. 
But in time the centripetal forces—followed by centrifugal 
secession, followed by war and centripetal results—
overwhelmed that uneasy federalist accommodation. Slavery 
was pushed onto the national political agenda by, among other 
factors, policies that forced Northern states to protect slavery 
even within their own territory. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
required Northern states to arrest escaped slaves and return 
them to their former masters.34 The Supreme Court’s Dred 
Scott decision established that slave owners retained their 
right to own other humans even while traveling in the free ter-
ritories.35 These decisions went a long way towards nationaliz-
ing slavery. The consequence, as so often happens when deep 
moral divisions are no longer treated as acceptable, was that 
the losers—the North—reacted and, in effect, declared: if it is 
to be all one way, it will be our morals, not yours! The fight be-
tween North and South over control of national slavery policy 
thereby proceeded through a long series of conflicts, and at-
tempted compromises, over whether territories and new states 
would establish slavery (and by extension how much represen-
tation pro-slavery forces would have in the national govern-
ment). Ultimately the Republican Party was formed as a na-
tional anti-slavery party, Abraham Lincoln was elected 
President, and the South seceded. Both sides in this conflict 
feared that the other would win out, and impose its morality 
nationwide. And this fear sparked the ultimate centrifugal re-
sponse—civil war. 
 
 33. See, e.g., Ryan Jordan, Quakers, “Comeouters,” and the Meaning of 
Abolitionism in the Antebellum Free States, 24 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 587, 588–
89 (2004) (noting that many in the North who opposed slavery viewed the abo-
litionists as a threat to religious liberty). 
 34. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 STAT. 462 (repealed 1864). 
 35. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 464–65 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment¸ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–26 (1842) (holding that the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1793 preempted a Pennsylvania state law protecting slaves from being taken 
out of the state into slavery). 
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Significantly, Lincoln, however anti-slavery he may have 
been, until 1863 focused primarily on preserving the Union.36 
What was most unacceptable to him was not slavery in a lim-
ited part of the land—it was the break up of the federalist sys-
tem. Centrifugalism had to be put down. For the moment, the 
cause had to be “Union Forever!” The United States had to be 
preserved, even if on this moral issue its compact seemed to 
have failed. And if the result was that the Northern, anti-
slavery morality ruled universally—or instead that on this is-
sue now and thereafter we accepted the South’s immorality—
that was of secondary concern. Indeed, in 1861 Congress even 
passed, and sent to the states for ratification, a constitutional 
amendment that would have made states’ power to maintain 
slavery an unamendable feature of the Constitution.37 But this 
compromise was rejected by the states. 
And so the war came, with an immense amount of blood-
shed, and the moral justness of the cause—by the end of the 
war no longer just “the Union” but also the total abolition of 
slavery—asserted. The irony of this assertion, given the all-too-
soon reestablishment of overt racial oppression and the hun-
dred-year federalist compromise on that issue, is but another 
insight into the problematic nature of moral federalism, of 
which more later. What matters now is that our federalist Un-
ion survived because, and only because, we had and have a very 
powerful central government which could martial force—
economic and military—to keep the Union together. And, in 
keeping it together, the central government decided both which 
moral values would thereafter be national and which, instead, 
could continue to be different, and local. 
The lesson of this story is that when a localized, decentral-
ized solution of a morally deeply divided issue is abandoned, 
through the actions of a national institution capable of central-
izing the issue, it is very unlikely that a decentralized—
compromise—solution can be made acceptable and reestab-
 
 36. See, e.g., 5 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, To Horace Greeley, in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 388, 388 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“My para-
mount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or 
to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would 
do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.”). 
 37. See J. Res. 13, 36th Cong. (1861). Lincoln stated that he had no objec-
tion to this amendment. See 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address—
Final Text, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 270 (Roy P. 
Basler ed., 1953). 
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lished. Once slavery was nationalized by Congress and the Su-
preme Court, it became a significant part of the anti-slavery 
agenda to abolish it throughout the land. And though it soon 
became apparent that a national pro-slavery solution was 
doomed, the South’s retreat to a localized, states’ rights solu-
tion was also doomed. Centripetalism had won, and the ques-
tion became: Whose moral views would dominate and be im-
posed nationally? And this remained so even in the face of 
attempts by a not insignificant number of slave states, which 
rejected secession and stayed in the federal union, and many 
distinguished contemporary statesmen, to search for such a lo-
calized, “federalist” solution. Lincoln could say he was fighting 
for the Union and not over slavery, but what he had also said, 
that a nation cannot be half-slave and half-free, had come to 
pass.38 
If the American system of federalism survived only because 
we had a central government strong enough to dominate, by 
force even, the moral and cultural commitment of white south-
erners to slavery, the history of the post-World War II Europe-
an Union is quite different. The “central government,” such as 
it is, of the European Union is extraordinarily weak—as weak 
as or weaker than our own, quickly failing, Articles of Confed-
eration. Yet, until just now, “Europe” has survived. Why? And 
what does the reason for its past survival tell us about Europe’s 
current problems? 
The reason for the European Union’s survival at least until 
now stems, we would assert, from the fact that within the core 
of “old Europe”—Italy, Germany, France, the Low Countries 
 
 38. One other matter regarding slavery deserves attention. And this, 
pointed out to us by Professor Steven Calabresi, has to do with the significance 
of multi-unit federal unions versus few-unit federalisms. See Calabresi, supra 
note 20. When a federalist polity is made up of many “sovereign” units, with 
very different moral values, which themselves differ among those who, on the 
whole, take the same side, the union is more likely to survive than when the 
sovereign states are few and the opposing moral values are not attenuated 
over many different units. That America has fifty states, and even at the start 
of the Civil War had thirty-four states is, and was, very important. In a way, 
the Civil War and secession became likely because, on slavery, the issue al-
most divided the Union in two. But in another sense, secession may have 
failed because, even as to that issue, there were an important number of sov-
ereign units which, though pro-slavery, were more nuanced than, say, South 
Carolina, and so did not secede. What would have happened in the Civil War if 
the four non-seceding slave states had joined the South is hard to say. See id. 
at 586 (“Had the slave states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri 
seceded, forcing the relocation of the capitol to New York or Philadelphia, the 
North would probably have lost the Civil War.”). 
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(but query, England)—the value differences are remarkably 
limited. Despite different languages, histories of war, and some 
religious variations, these countries think pretty much alike—
morally—on the crucial issues of the day. Religious differences 
exist, but they are nowhere near as widely held and fierce as 
the opposing worldviews of secularists and born-again Chris-
tians in the United States.39 On topics like the death penalty 
there is inter-state unanimity: the practice of capital punish-
ment precludes membership in the European Union.40 At a triv-
ial—but revealing—level, Europe can even contemplate a uni-
form law of torts, or of contracts, something almost unthinkable 
here.41 Cultural differences exist, of course, and are cherished. 
Germans vacation in Italy, and Italians work in Germany, for 
good reasons. And this helps explain the perdurance of a feder-
alist structure. But the differences, since the Second World 
War, and until recently, have not risen to a level of moral in-
tensity that would require strong central authority to mediate 
and control. 
Recent developments suggest possible changes in this dy-
namic, with concomitant pressure on the current European 
“Constitution.” Europe, at times, has considered expanding 
and, for good economic and defense reasons, bringing in nations 
whose cultural and moral values are different from those of “old 
Europe,” from those that Europe’s founders—Adenauer, Monet, 
De Gasperi—took for granted.42 If Middle Eastern countries ev-
er became part of Europe, for example, moral disagreements, 
accompanied by centrifugal and centripetal forces, would in-
crease substantially. To a lesser degree, the admission of Tur-
key into the European Union would likely cause a similar dy-
namic.43 In some ways Turkey is “European,” but in other ways 
 
 39. See The American-Western European Values Gap, PEW RES. CTR.  
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western 
-european-values-gap (“Americans also distinguish themselves from Western 
Europeans on views about the importance of religion. Half of Americans deem 
religion very important in their lives; fewer than a quarter in Spain (22%), 
Germany (21%), Britain (17%) and France (13%) share this view.”). 
 40. See Council Guideline (EC) No. 8416/13 of 12 Apr. 2013 (stating guide-
lines on death penalty positions for member states).  
 41. See, e.g., Arthur Hartkamp, Principles of Contract Law, in TOWARDS A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 107–09 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
 42. See Ernesto J. Vidal Gil, The Social State Based on the Rule of Law in 
the Europe of Rights, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES 
AND ANSWERS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 179–89 (Jesús Ballesteros et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 43. See Paul Kubicek, Turkish Accession to the European Union: Chal-
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it is not. Turkey joining Europe may for many reasons be a very 
wise idea. But if it does, those disagreements that we in Ameri-
ca take for granted, given our deep and geographically linked 
differences, will likely arise in this broader Europe. And a 
strong central government, far stronger than the extant one, 
will be needed to mediate and control them if that broader Eu-
rope is to survive. 
But if the expansion of Europe invites only a speculative 
consideration of value differences and the strength of the cen-
tral authority, very recent events in old Europe give a more di-
rect, concrete illustration. 
Until a few years ago, the important economic differences 
within old Europe did not take on moral connotations. As such, 
they could be dealt with even by a weak central government. 
The events of the last few years came close to changing all that. 
Germany, and many of its citizens, came to view Greece and its 
government’s economic behavior—high public sector spending, 
low tax collection, large debt—as not just economically flawed, 
but as truly immoral.44 And the Greeks made quite clear that 
they considered Germany’s reaction and its economic policies to 
be morally despicable.45 All of a sudden, previously manageable 
differences came to bear the kinds of value connotations that 
we know all too well in the United (but morally divided) States. 
The proposed solutions to the 2015 Greek economic crisis seem 
to us good illustrations of what we have been saying about fed-
eralist structures. 
During this crisis there were two approaches suggested, 
and a third implicitly countenanced. The first approach was to 
make the central European government stronger. This was ear-
ly, and repeatedly, advocated as a solution to the crisis.46 If eco-
nomic differences between the European countries are to take 
on deep moral connotations, then it is essential for the survival 
of the European Union that it have a powerful central govern-
 
lenges and Opportunities, 168 WORLD AFFAIRS 67, 73–74 (2005). 
 44. See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit, German Public Stands Behind Angela Mer-
kel’s Tough Stance on Greece, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2015), http://www.wsj 
.com/articles/german-public-stands-behind-angela-merkels-tough-stance-on 
-greece-1435673522. 
 45. See Dan Bloom, Angry Greeks Compare Germans to Nazis After They 
Are Forced into Austerity-Laden £60bn Bailout, MIRROR (July 13, 2015), http:// 
www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/angry-greeks-compare-germans-nazis 
-6059006. 
 46. See, e.g., JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPLETING 
EUROPE’S ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 4–5 (2015). 
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ment. Such a government would be able to dictate what will be 
decided uniformly by all the different states, and what instead 
can be decided locally by an individual state regardless of how 
immoral its decision may seem to the other states. 
The second solution, suggested with equal frequency, was 
centrifugal. Break up the Union, at least in part.47 If the rest of 
Europe views the Greeks’ economic behavior as immoral, and 
Greece in turn views Europe’s reactions as foul, then Greece 
should pull out (or be pushed out). Secession, or “excommuni-
tyification,” solves the problem. Lincoln would wince, and 
America fought the Civil War to avoid this outcome, ending up 
with an even stronger central government. But separation is a 
real possibility when the values of different parts of a federal-
ism are too much at odds, and the central government is not 
strong enough to control and mediate the differences. 
The third approach, which has been less openly discussed 
but nonetheless seems to be the one that Europe has chosen, is 
to compromise and deescalate.48 To the extent that the differ-
ences between the countries can return to being merely finan-
cial, and not also deeply moral, perhaps Germany and Greece 
can make do. Whether this toning down will actually work in 
the long term remains to be seen. But if it does, then Europe 
may be able to stay united even without a strong central gov-
ernment. The moral and cultural differences among its parts, 
though strong enough and important enough to preclude a uni-
tary structure, are also attenuated enough that creating a pow-
erful central government to control them is not essential. The 
various parts accept their reciprocal moral and cultural differ-
ences without having to deal with destructive centrifugal and 
centripetal forces, because their moral conflicts are usually not 
that great. Some moral issues are, of course, decided centrally 
and uniformly—as we have said, prohibition of capital punish-
ment is a uniform rule in Europe.49 But it can be so decided be-
cause there is a degree of uniformity across old Europe with re-
spect to that moral issue which permits a single, uniform 
 
 47. See, e.g., Allister Heath, The Game Is up. It’s Time for Greece To Leave 
the Eurozone and Move on, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.telegraph 
.co.uk/finance/economics/11378396/The-game-is-up.-Its-time-for-Greece-to 
-leave-the-eurozone-and-move-on.html. 
 48. See Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt 
-crisis-euro.html. 
 49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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resolution even without a strong central government to enforce 
it. If the economic differences between old Europe can be de-
moralized, and returned to ordinary questions of public policy, 
perhaps a weak central government can handle these as well. 
Such non-conflictual resolutions are essential to maintaining 
the status quo in Europe. 
The relationship between England and the rest of Europe 
has always been more problematic. But it too reflects just what 
we have been saying. The moral and cultural differences be-
tween England and the core of Europe are small relative to 
those within the United States.50 But they are, and have long 
been, greater than those among those countries that are the 
core of Europe. And this explains how England could remain, 
sort of, a part of Europe for some sixty years, despite the weak-
ness of the “European” government, and then—perhaps, be-
cause the tale of Brexit is not yet fully over51—vote to pull out 
when a couple of moral issues (primarily immigration) heated 
up a bit. 
Who can doubt that, were the European central govern-
ment just a little stronger, Brexit would have failed? And even 
so weak a government as that in Brussels may still have 
enough clout ultimately to make the cost of Brexit too great, 
but perhaps not. In the end the factors at play remain the 
same: how great are the economic and defense considerations 
that argue for a federalist union despite moral differences; how 
deeply felt are those moral differences in fact; and how capable 
is the central government to require its component parts to ac-
cept both what is to be national and what will stay local. How 
Brexit will end up depends on these factors, and remains to be 
seen. What cannot be doubted, though, is that the stronger the 
central government, the more moral differences can be counte-
nanced within a federal union, and the weaker the central gov-
ernment, the more even minor differences can lead to its 
breakup despite economic and defense reasons for its survival. 
 
 50. Leaving aside the question of Scotland and its moral differences with 
England. 
 51. While the referendum to leave the European Union did pass, it is not 
necessarily binding on the government. See John Cassidy, Why Brexit Might 
Not Happen at All, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/john-cassidy/why-brexit-might-not-happen-at-all. 
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III.  CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN 
ORDINARY POLITICS   
In the United States there is no longer a serious threat 
that moral conflicts will cause states to secede from the union. 
The history of the Civil War and the very strong central gov-
ernment that resulted from it guarantee that. As a result, to-
day we are “one nation.” Nonetheless, the different states are 
still deeply divided on moral questions. These differences are 
even today greater than those in old Europe. Some may doubt 
this claim. And there certainly are things as to which we have 
been more united than old Europe. Language, for many years, 
was one. Whether it continues to be, as English becomes the 
Lingua Franca (pun intended) of Europe, and Spanish grows in 
significance in the United States, remains to be seen.52 But 
those things that distinguish the European countries from one 
another, though deeply cultural, rarely generate—today—the 
moral outrage that characterizes Americans’ differences. Who 
can doubt the deep geographic divide, in America, of moral atti-
tudes with respect to guns, abortion, capital punishment, gay 
marriage, religious fundamentalism, assisted suicide, and 
more?53 Maine and Texas are very, very different from each 
other, however much each might deem its own values to be 
America’s values.54 In the nineteenth century, when a magnetic 
 
 52. See Steve Doughty, English Is the Lingua Franca of Europeans as Two 
Thirds Speak the Language Which Has Squeezed out All Its Rivals, DAILY 
MAIL (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2436051/ 
English-lingua-franca-Europeans-thirds-speak-language-squeezed-rivals.html. 
 53. See, e.g., Michael Lipka, Gay Marriage Arrives in the South, Where the 
Public Is Less Enthused, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/15/gay-marriage-arrives-in-the-south 
-where-the-public-is-less-enthused; Widening Regional Divide over Abortion 
Laws, PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/29/ 
widening-regional-divide-over-abortion-laws. 
 54. On this point we disagree with the work of scholars who view Ameri-
cans’ moral and cultural attachments to their particular states as unim-
portant. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 17, at 96–123; ROBERT A. 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 7 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Parti-
san Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1109–13 (2014); Edward L. Rubin, 
Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
SOC. SCI. 37, 45–46 (2001). For a fascinating discussion of the moral and cul-
tural differences between the states, and the extent to which people still iden-
tify with their home states in our federalist system, see Ernest A. Young, The 
Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture 
(Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-11, 2015), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552866. See also Ernest A. 
Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1150–53 (2014). 
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telegraph was being run from Maine to Texas, Henry David 
Thoreau wrote that “Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing 
important to communicate.”55 That may well have been an ex-
aggeration then, and is perhaps more so now. But, all too often, 
what they do have to say to each other is disapproving! And 
yet, with an occasional secessionist twinge,56 they both want 
and need to be part of a truly United (and genuinely federalist) 
States. 
Because of these moral differences, centrifugalism and 
centripetalism are still defining features of American politics.57 
On a multiplicity of issues, groups try to establish their moral 
beliefs as national policy. They do so by appealing to Congress, 
the President, and the federal courts. At the same time, those 
holding opposing views seek to protect their own moral posi-
tions by arguing for states’ rights (or, if the opportunity arises, 
by seeking in turn to impose their morality nationwide). These 
fights over the nationalization of moral issues involve a wide 
variety of different institutional moves—national legislation, 
presidential enforcement decisions, judicial rulings, even con-
stitutional amendments. And once a single moral position is 
clearly established as national policy, those holding the oppo-
site position must either acquiesce or adopt strategies of persis-
tent resistance, such as attempting to gain control of the na-
tional government through elections, or using their control over 
 
 55. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (1854), reprinted in WALDEN, CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE, AND OTHER WRITINGS 39 (William Rossi ed., 3d ed. 2008). 
 56. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Governor’s Secession Talk Stirs 
Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A15. 
 57. Our observations here about American federalist politics are related to 
an idea that Professor Heather Gerken has labeled the “discursive benefits of 
structure.” See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An 
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1894–97 (2014) (“One of the nationalist school’s 
distinctive contributions is showing how structural arrangements help tee up 
national debates, accommodate political competition, and work through nor-
mative conflict. . . . [T]his work considers how national debates and national 
identity are forged against the background of these structural arrange-
ments.”); see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Feder-
alism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2097 (2014) 
(arguing that federalism provides a framework for national integration by al-
lowing for ongoing negotiation of disagreements through decentralized law-
making institutions). One important difference between our argument and the 
type of argument Professor Gerken identifies is that we see federalist contes-
tation not just as an opportunity for transformative democratic discourse, but 
also, and often, as a source of divisive political struggle over who will get to 
impose their moral views nationwide. 
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state governments to undermine the national policy.58 Only 
rarely (but not quite never) is the issue later returned to state 
control. This basic pattern defines the modern politics of feder-
alism in the United States.59 But, given the multiplicity of dif-
ferent institutional moves available in national politics, the de-
tails vary widely from conflict to conflict. Here some historical 
examples may prove illuminating. 
The sequelae to the end of slavery provide a classic story of 
a moral issue—racial equality—being denationalized, given 
over to state control, and then renationalized nearly a century 
later. For a time after the Civil War and the passage of the 
great egalitarian amendments, XIII, XIV, and XV, the end of 
slavery seemed to presage a national moral imperative of equal 
rights regardless of race.60 But it was not to be. If a return to a 
local compromise on slavery was doomed by nationalization of 
the issue through Dred Scott and the Fugitive Slave Act, subju-
gation of African Americans on a local, state-determined level 
soon enough took its place. The political events that brought it 
about seem almost arbitrary. Reconstruction was destroyed by 
the Rutherford B. Hayes mis-election of 1876, and probably 
even more so by the seemingly random assassination of James 
Garfield, a devout, fiercely abolitionist Ohioan who had pledged 
to send the Northern troops back South.61 But whatever the 
chance events, North and South all too soon were ready to com-
promise on a new local “solution.” Segregation, and virtually to-
tal subjugation of the nominally equal African American citi-
zens, became an accepted matter of states’ rights, and 
remained so for just about as long as slavery itself had been a 
local matter! This did not truly begin to change until the mid-
dle part of the 20th Century, when the great centripetalizing 
 
 58. As Professors Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have 
shown, state (and even local) majorities can resist policies they find immoral 
in a variety of different ways, even after having lost at the national level. See 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–84 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All 
the Way down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60–71 (2009). 
 59. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 54, at 1092–1108 (describing how 
American federalism allows parties that are in the minority nationally, but 
that hold a majority in some states, to contest the policies of the national ma-
jority party through states’ rights litigation and local policymaking). 
 60. W.E.B. Du Bois’s classic article on the Freedmen’s Bureau is but one 
illustration of Reconstruction’s lost promise. W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The 
Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1901, at 354. 
 61. See Vincent P. De Santis, President Garfield and the Solid South, 36 
N.C. HIST. REV. 442, 465 (1959). 
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force of the civil rights movement pushed the issue of racial 
equality onto the national agenda. The NAACP’s legal strategy 
revived the Reconstruction Amendments by convincing the fed-
eral courts to outlaw racial segregation.62 The executive branch 
ultimately (and grudgingly) enforced these rulings, and Con-
gress eventually enacted the Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
Rights Act. All of this happened, of course, in the face of mas-
sive state resistance at every stage. This story is familiar to any 
student of recent history. And that state resistance does seem 
to have ultimately subsided now, many decades later, at least 
in the narrow sense that no political figure could today openly 
advocate for racial segregation without facing severe conse-
quences.63 Desegregation is thus a dramatic example of a moral 
viewpoint that becomes imposed nationwide, one to which even 
the resisting states eventually acquiesce, even if parts of their 
citizenry remain, to some considerable degree, nostalgic for its 
opposite. 
A similar cycle of localization and nationalization can be 
seen in America’s experiment with alcohol prohibition, though 
with a radically different outcome. The successes of the Ameri-
can temperance movement began at the local level, with a se-
ries of state laws prohibiting alcohol that were enacted in the 
1850s.64 After the Supreme Court held in 1888 that these pro-
hibitions violated the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress 
enacted a centrifugal solution—the Wilson Act—empowering 
states to control transported liquor, but bringing the issue of 
prohibition into national politics.65 Eventually the advocates of 
 
 62. The NAACP developed its legal argument carefully over many cases 
spanning a number of decades. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975). 
 63. Though, as we have noted, one result of nationalizing a moral issue 
like racial justice is that those holding countervailing views can, once they 
gain control of a national governing institution, later impose their own moral 
vision nationwide. Note, for example, that the legal victories of the civil rights 
movement are today cited as support for reading the Fourteenth Amendment 
to restrict affirmative action. 
 64. See KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 168–71 (2014). 
 65. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago & 
Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 499–500 (1888); see also RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAP-
ING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, 
AND THE POLITY, 1880–1920, at 57 (1995) (“No act was more important to the 
course of the temperance movement than the Wilson Act . . . . For the next 
thirty years drys would follow the course . . . laid down in [the Wilson Act]. 
From it a trail of failed bills and occasionally successful measures would lead 
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temperance sought to impose their morality nationwide 
through a constitutional amendment, which was ultimately rat-
ified in 1917.66 Opposition to prohibition, however, grew over 
the subsequent years, especially in urban areas, as new immi-
grant communities with cultural attachments to alcohol gained 
political power, and as it became clear that prohibition had 
made law breaking “normal” and had hastened the spread of 
organized crime. This caused years of political conflict between 
the “wets” and the “drys,” with prohibition’s legislative sup-
porters even going so far as to refuse to reapportion Congress 
after the 1920 census, since the growth in urban areas had 
eroded support for the policy!67 The 1928 presidential election 
between the “wet” Al Smith and the “dry” Herbert Hoover was 
a major turning point in this conflict.68 And while Hoover won 
that race, the policy of prohibition did not long outlive his pres-
idency.69 The “wet” forces prevailed, the Eighteenth Amend-
ment was repealed by the Twenty-First, and the question of 
whether to permit alcohol was returned to state control.70 This 
seems like a classic centrifugal solution, in that power was re-
turned to the states. If a state wishes to ban alcohol today, it 
still can. But, in another sense, the position of the “wets” won 
out entirely. After all, how effective is it for a state to prohibit 
alcohol in a country where it is freely available in other states, 
and can be easily transported?71 
Indeed, a similar federalism dynamic is arising today with 
the decisions of various states to decriminalize marijuana. 
While there is a federal law prohibiting the sale of marijuana, 
the United States Department of Justice has created its own 
centrifugal solution, declining to enforce that federal law in 
 
ultimately to passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act.”). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). 
 67. This was the only time in American history that Congress refused to 
fulfill its constitutional mandate to reapportion. See DANIEL OKRENT, LAST 
CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 239–41 (2010). 
 68. See id. at 302–03. 
 69. See id. at 306–09. 
 70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 71. The point is generalizable. If the people of Maine are able to go to 
Vermont to purchase an item that Maine has prohibited, and bring it back to 
Maine, then Maine’s prohibition is largely meaningless, and there is a de facto 
national policy of toleration for that activity even if the states are formally 
given control. But see Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Hetero-
geneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 858–59 (2002) (argu-
ing that states have the power to regulate the activities of their citizens when 
they travel out of state). 
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states (like Colorado, Oregon, and Washington) that decrimi-
nalize and regulate the drug.72 And much like the legalization 
of alcohol on a state-by-state basis, this policy seems likely to 
lead to nationwide availability (if not actual legalization) of 
marijuana.73 
Abortion provides another example of a national struggle 
between different moral viewpoints that has been subject to 
centripetal forces and a states’ rights backlash. Prior to the Su-
preme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision, states had a variety of dif-
ferent approaches to regulating abortion, with most states 
heavily restricting abortion but some others liberalizing it.74 
When the Court created a nationwide right to abortion in Roe, 
it sparked a decades-long conservative backlash. Opponents of 
abortion have argued that the states should decide abortion 
policy, and so they have sought to ensure the nomination of 
Supreme Court Justices who would reverse Roe. And they have 
also put in place innumerable state laws that restrict access to 
abortion. At the same time, abortion opponents have also en-
acted national legislation restricting abortion, like the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 2003,75 and have advanced arguments 
that the Constitution actually prohibits abortion. Similarly, 
supporters of abortion rights have both opposed all national 
partial anti-abortion laws, and looked to the Supreme Court to 
strike down local restrictions on abortion.76 One can see here 
 
 72. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. 
Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913 
2756857467.pdf (outlining Department of Justice policy for enforcement of 
federal marijuana law in states with conflicting regimes); see also Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 
979–82 (2016) (describing how executive branch policy on issues like marijua-
na criminalization can facilitate state differentiation). An analogous form of 
executive branch centrifugalism can be seen in the failure of the federal gov-
ernment to enforce national civil rights laws in the period between Recon-
struction and the civil rights movement. 
 73. Indeed, Nebraska and Oklahoma have even brought a lawsuit against 
Colorado in the Supreme Court, arguing that Colorado’s decriminalization of 
marijuana makes it impossible to enforce their own drug laws effectively. See 
Jack Healy, 2 Neighbors of Colorado Sue over Marijuana Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2014, at A21. 
 74. See Sarah Kliff, CHARTS: How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion 
Rights, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/22/charts-how-roe-v-wade-changed-abortion 
-rights. 
 75. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 76. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 
(2016). 
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the strategic element of federalism claims—holders of a certain 
moral viewpoint run to federalism when they are losing nation-
ally, but they happily abandon “states’ rights” if they sense the 
possibility of nationwide victory. 
Capital punishment also helps to illustrate the strategic 
use of federalism. In Europe, capital punishment is manifestly 
a European issue, and its abolition a core part of Europe’s self-
definition. In America it is largely local, even in the face of a 
part of our national Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, 
which would make its nationalization relatively easy.77 The Su-
preme Court did briefly strike down the death penalty on due 
process grounds in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia,78 but 
quickly reversed course when a large number of states enacted 
new death penalty statutes in response.79 And so, after this 
dramatically failed attempt at centripetalism, capital punish-
ment is today mostly a state matter, though with important 
federal, Constitution-based restrictions.80 Yet, conversely, pro-
ponents of the death penalty have achieved a form of nationali-
zation by establishing its use in federal prosecutions in states 
that prohibit capital punishment. Prior to the 2000s, the De-
partment of Justice virtually never sought the death penalty in 
a state where it was prohibited. But Attorney General John 
Ashcroft reversed that policy, reasoning that geographic 
disuniformity in the death penalty was unfair, and so expanded 
its use.81 The result is that today states like Massachusetts and 
 
 77. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 
2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I believe it highly likely that 
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 78. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 79. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976). As one of us has 
previously noted, some of the state politicians who voted for these new death 
penalty statutes did so under the assumption that the statutes would then be 
struck down by the Supreme Court (rendering the vote costless for those who 
opposed capital punishment but did not wish to take a stand against it). Thus 
the Supreme Court may, ironically, have helped to strengthen the pro-death 
penalty backlash with its strong rhetoric in Furman. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 26–27 (1982). 
 80. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (prohibiting 
capital punishment for the crime of raping a child “where the crime did not 
result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim”); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting capital punishment for non-adult 
offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (prohibiting capital 
punishment for offenders with intellectual disabilities). 
 81. See Richard B. Schmitt, Ashcroft Is Undeterred in Push for Capital 
Cases, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/sep/29/ 
nation/na-death29. 
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Vermont, which prohibit capital punishment, nonetheless have 
seen criminal defendants sentenced to death within their terri-
tory.82 Thus executive discretion can be a centripetal force as 
well. 
Finally, the recent conflict over same-sex marriage pro-
vides an excellent illustration of how competing moral claim-
ants bring centripetal and centrifugal forces to bear in their 
struggle for supremacy. The first salvo in this fight was the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 
which held that refusing to marry same-sex couples was poten-
tially unconstitutional sex discrimination.83 Following this deci-
sion, more than forty states (including Hawaii) adopted laws 
and constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage.84 Congress also enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, 
which withheld federal benefits from those in same-sex mar-
riages and permitted states to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in other states (an interesting instance of 
centripetalism hiding behind a veneer of centrifugalism).85 
Then, a decade after Baehr, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
held in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that denial of 
same-sex marriage violated the Massachusetts Constitution,86 
and the City of San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples without state authorization.87 These deci-
sions sparked a powerful nationwide backlash, including the 
proposal in Congress, and widespread support by conservatives, 
of a constitutional amendment that would have defined mar-
riage in the United States as only heterosexual.88 This amend-
 
 82. For an argument in favor of more local control over the federal use of 
the death penalty, see United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 289–90 (2d Cir. 
2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 83. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 84. See Barbara J. Cox, From One Town’s “Alternative Families” Ordi-
nance to Marriage Equality Nationwide, 52 CAL. W.L. REV. 65, 73 (2015). 
 85. See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated 
by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); DOMA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2012). 
 86. See Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 
2003). 
 87. See David Stout, San Francisco City Officials Perform Gay Marriages, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/national/san 
-francisco-city-officials-perform-gay-marriages.html. 
 88. See H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing an amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States defining marriage as between a man and 
a woman).  
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ment was opposed on states’ rights grounds by same-sex mar-
riage supporters, who sought to preserve the right of states to 
expand marriage. Then, a few years later, the tide began to 
turn and, as public approval of it steadily grew, state after 
state began adopting same-sex marriage through both court de-
cisions and legislation. Ultimately the supporters of same-sex 
marriage turned to their own centripetal solution, appealing to 
the Supreme Court not only to strike down the Defense of Mar-
riage Act,89 but soon after to declare that there is a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage.90 And today, quite ironically, 
opponents of same-sex marriage have proposed a different con-
stitutional amendment—one that would allow states to define 
marriage for themselves!91 
All of these historical examples serve to show that moral 
conflicts in a healthy federalism involve a complex, multi-stage 
game. One side seeks to nationalize its moral position through 
some federal institution, be it the courts, legislation, executive 
action, or a constitutional amendment. Then the other side in-
vokes the principle of states’ rights to argue against this na-
tionalization. But these appeals to federalism are usually mere-
ly strategic, and accompanied by counter-moves in the national 
political game. If the national balance of power later becomes 
reversed, and the initial nationalizers find themselves on the 
losing end, then their opponents usually impose their own mo-
rality nationwide. The game becomes all or nothing. 
IV.  WHAT SHOULD BE NATIONAL? WHAT SHOULD BE 
LOCAL?   
This analysis of federalism may lead to cynical conclusions. 
It may be taken to suggest that federalism is not a political 
value in itself, but instead merely a tactic used by the support-
ers of different moral positions seeking to advance their pre-
ferred policies. But this does not necessarily follow. One can 
advocate federalism as a political value in itself, to be weighed 
against others, and not merely reducible to the policies one in-
vokes federalism to preserve. Embracing moral federalism 
might entail a kind of epistemic humility, recognizing that 
 
 89. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 90. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
 91. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Scott Walker Calls for Amendment Allowing 
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one’s own moral view may not be the correct one, or perhaps 
adopting a principle that even correct moral views should not 
be imposed on the unwilling. Or one could argue that federal-
ism is valuable precisely because it allows people with pro-
foundly different moral views to stay peacefully united in one 
country. 
But nevertheless, at least for elected officials like presi-
dents and legislators, other values will often trump the value of 
federalism. How, after all, can a politician advocate letting oth-
er states maintain racial segregation, or the death penalty, or 
access to abortion, or alcohol consumption, if they and their 
supporters find these deeply immoral? 
The question is different for judges, however. Federalism is 
not merely a political value; it is also a constitutional principle 
that must be interpreted and applied in a self-consistent way. 
It may be fine for politicians to switch positions on “states’ 
rights” depending on the policy outcomes they produce. But for 
judges and lawyers, federalism must have a legal meaning that 
does not depend on the vagaries of politics. And here is where it 
gets supremely tricky. 
At one time, one of us thought that constitutional federal-
ism principles required local determination of moral questions, 
except when those questions involved discrimination. Following 
the post-Civil War Amendments, according to this line of 
thought, discrimination was banned at the state level, and this 
ban became a fundamental structural principle of American 
constitutional law. But this is not how the Supreme Court’s 
rights doctrine has actually developed. For example, the very 
recent decision nationalizing the right to gay marriage quite 
self-consciously went beyond a relatively simple antidiscrimi-
nation basis to a broader—and much attacked in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissent—substantive due process grounding.92 Abor-
tion rights too were originally judicially nationalized not on the 
basis of discrimination against women, as then-Professor Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg and some scholars had urged,93 but, in Justice 
 
 92. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–2605; id. at 2616–23 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 93. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 381, 382–83 (1985); see 
also GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 98–114 
(1985) (describing the constitutional argument for abortion rights as about 
equality rather than due process). 
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Blackmun’s opinion, for substantive due process reasons.94 And 
on the flip side, the Supreme Court has invoked constitutional 
federalism principles to reverse and curtail a number of federal 
antidiscrimination laws that were enacted by Congress pursu-
ant to its own Fourteenth Amendment powers.95 Antidiscrimi-
nation, it can be plausibly argued, is thus not the guiding prin-
ciple of judicial federalism, at least in the modern Supreme 
Court. And whatever theory could describe the line between the 
national and the local in contemporary American law is far 
from clear. 
What is clear, however, is that at different times and as to 
different issues all three of our main national legal institu-
tions—the legislature, executive, and judiciary—have played a 
crucial role in defining, for our federalism, what is to be uni-
form and national in the face of great moral differences, and 
what is instead to be subject to local control despite strong dis-
approbation in parts of our somewhat United States. A lot more 
work is needed, both to describe when different moral issues 
are to be decided nationally and when locally, and also what in-
stitutions should take the lead either in localizing or in central-
izing the result. This Article is not the place to undertake that 
work. 
And so we end with a different question—how should a 
moral partisan deal with diverse moral values in a unified, but 
federal, state? Surely today no one can accept the notion that 
slavery can tolerably be a local issue. It is wrong and not to be 
countenanced—now or ever! And most would say the same as 
to segregation—we certainly would! But how far can one, 
should one, go in imposing one’s moral values on “unbelievers”? 
And should one be influenced in making that decision by the 
historical knowledge that once one successfully claims national 
status for a moral position, national determination usually be-
 
 94. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
 95. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding 
unconstitutional the coverage formula for pre-clearance found in § 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress’s findings did not justify abroga-
tion of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for money damages 
under Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 
(2012) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutionally 
exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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comes unshakably established? The national result, however, 
may well ultimately be the opposite of that believed in by the 
original nationalizers.96 It would thus seem prudent to national-
ize your values only if you are quite sure you will win out, and 
prevail not just in the short run but in the long run as well. 
But can it be acceptable, in the face of uncertainty as to ul-
timate result, to allow things like slavery and segregation to 
perdure nationally without fierce opposition? The abolitionists 
were troublesome, surely, but in their desire to do away with 
human bondage nationally they were also profoundly right! 
Still, as to the issue of slavery, and as to the many moral issues 
dividing our federalism today, one cannot help but ask: When is 
nationalizing them worth the risk? And when is not taking the 
risk itself immoral? 
 
 96. Witness the examples of slavery and same-sex marriage. 
